Friday, April 25, 2014

The Problem of Evil and Theodicy



The purpose of this site is to attempt to explain the problem of evil and analyze resulting theodicies. The problem of evil is the theological quandary that attempts to explain how an all-powerful and benevolent deity could let the apparent evils of the world come to pass, while theodicies are religious apologies attempting to answer why a loving God would allow the manifestation of evil in the world.
The problem of evil can be schematized in general logic and explained evidentially. The earliest form of the logical problem of evil was circulated within the Epicurean school of philosophy in ancient Greece. The argument that God and evil can't both logically exist looks like this:

Good point, I guess...
1. God is an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent entity.
2. Therefore, God knows of all evil, has the ability to prevent evil, and is interested in preventing evil.
3. Logically, God and evil can’t simultaneously exist.
3. We know evil to exist.
4. Thus, God (as defined in premise 1) does not exist.

God, as defined in the first premise of the argument, is a being with three properties (namely, omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence). By omniscience, we mean to say that God has the capacity to know everything that can possibly be known. Similarly, omnipotence is the power to do all things that can possibly be done. Omnibenevolence, finally, is the idea that God is perfectly good, where good is variously interpreted as just, loving, or merciful by different theologians. Evil, as mentioned in the second, third and fourth premises, refers to the various human and non-human causes of suffering. In particular, we must focus, within the problem of evil, on evils that can't be morally justified as punishment for misbehavior or evils that are causally related to possible goods.
Additionally, one can make an argument for an evidential problem of evil. Since human free will can be argued as a potential solution for the logical problem of evil, there exist further claims that specific inductive evidence of explicitly non-human or gratuitous human  evils lowers the probability of theism, even if it is not totally logically impossible.
We can observe innumerable natural evils that occur constantly without any human action. Take, for example, a simple tree falling in a forest. In this example, let us say that a rabbit has just given birth to a group of newborn bunnies. As the tree falls, it crushes one of these baby bunnies to death. Within a utilitarian calculus that seeks to minimize suffering (the most logical method of moral judgment, especially given the omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent deity at the helm), there are only two related explanations for justifying the baby bunny’s death. The death of the bunny must have either generated an outcome of positive benefits for other beings outweighing the negative fate (so-called “greater good”) or prevented some even greater suffering from taking place (“greater evil”). However, these explanations seem implausible. Assume that there are no extraordinary circumstances within this example. The bunny meat did not magically multiply and feed thousands of starving animals (“greater good”), nor did the baby bunny push its bunny brethren away from the tree to save their lives (“greater evil”). The bunny simply died. Was there an ultimate purpose to the bunny’s short and painful life? If so, it remains to be seen.

Sorry for poking holes in your beliefs, I guess...
 A widely cited example of a gratuitous evil is the Shoah. From 1938 to 1945, approximately six million of the nine million European Jews in existence were systematically imprisoned in especially deplorable conditions before ultimately being killed by the government of Germany. This was the largest-scale instance of genocide ever executed in human history. It is particularly notable as an example of the problem of evil because the Bible proclaims Jews to be the “treasured people” of God. It seems especially egregious, then, that an all-loving and all-powerful God would let the chosen people be nearly exterminated for no clearly evident purpose. While there are possible “greater good” and “greater evil” arguments to be made in the case of the Shoah, they seem like painfully hypothetical apologetics that attempt to explain away the suffering of many innocent, God-fearing people. Given this, theological analysis of the Holocaust such as that of American scholar Richard Rubenstein leaves only two plausible outcomes of the evidential problem of evil. First, we have the possibility that God (at least the “omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent entity” described above) does not exist. Second, we have the deistic possibility that God exists, but his omnibenevolence is so narrowly defined that he doesn’t care enough about the suffering of humans to intervene in the world.
Sometimes we wish we could explain away horrific events, but things aren't so simple.
 Attempts to reconcile the simultaneous existence of both God and unnecessary or unjustified evil are known as theodicies. Below, five common theodicies are offered as counterarguments to the previous explanations of the problem of evil. We will analyze these theodicies to see if they indeed discount the issues raised by the existence of both suffering and a loving God.
Before we look at theodicies, it is important to more precisely define what we consider good or evil. Certainly, the “greater good/greater evil” argument can be possible, or even demonstrably true, depending on the circumstance. An event can be described as intrinsically evil or good (that is, a prima facie cause of suffering or happiness, respectively). An event can also be instrumentally good or evil, meaning that the event leads or somehow contributes indirectly to subsequent good or evil events. These classifications are not mutually exclusive. It is possible to think, for example, an event that is both intrinsically evil and instrumentally good (thus, a “greater good”). A man can potentially deprive himself of worldly pleasures, an intrinsic evil, to gain intellectual enlightenment, an instrumental good. This further complicates the notions of good and evil events due to the extreme complexity of physical causality.
German polymath Gottfried Leibniz, inventor of the theodicy concept, wore only the finest wigs.
 1: Suffering is a punishment for sin. 
If we say that suffering is the punishment for sin then why do innocent children suffer? For example the torture, rape and murder of innocent babies. Most people would agree that babies are not capable of sin, but the suffering of babies does exist. So, even if some suffering is a punishment for sin, it does not explain all suffering. Take heed of the examples of natural and gratuitous evils previously provided.
2: We are creatures of flesh and blood who are vulnerable to accident, disease, and other destructive assaults upon our existence and well-being. 
Christians believe that humans are created in the image of God. If that were to be true, then God would be created of flesh and blood and also vulnerable to accident, disease, and other destruction. Thus, either we are not created in the image of God, or God is not all-powerful. If we are not created in the image of God, the question still stands: why would God create a being so vulnerable?  Two answers would be that God either (a) created vulnerable beings for the purpose of suffering or (b) God did not create humans at all. If God did create humans with the intent of suffering, then one could question whether or not God is all good.
3: We are free moral beings and can misuse our freedom to cause harm to ourselves or others. 
One issue that arises when one looks at free will and God is that the concept of foreknowledge and free will do not go together. Either God does not know what will happen in the future, or free will does not exist. If free will does not exist, then God is the sole creator of suffering and evil. If God does not have the power of foreknowledge, then God is not all-knowing.
4: Suffering is designed by God to be a part of the world so that by facing the challenge evil poses, we can freely move toward moral perfection, which is God's aim for us. 
Some would say that it is possible that God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil. Maybe God’s reason is the creation of moral perfection. What many would question is whether or not moral perfection truly exists. Even if we say that it does, most would agree that it is fairly rare. If moral perfection is such an uncommon thing, then God did not create a very successful system (which would imply that God is not all-powerful after all).
5: We live in a law-abiding world containing many beings interacting with each other. Destructive interactions and consequences are bound to follow. But it is the law-abiding character of the world that enables us to learn and to carry out our purposes. 
The first question would be: what “law” are we supposed to be following, the laws of God or the laws of man? Most people would agree (since the topic is God and evil) that the laws of man are irrelevant unless the laws of man are created by God. Either way, we come back to the laws of God, directly or indirectly. It is highly questionable to what degree the laws of God are followed by mankind. Some people may follow some of the laws of God but it is rare that one follows all of the laws of God. With that being the case, it is unlikely that a law-abiding character truly exists.
In summation, the theodicies analyzed contain no convincing explanation for the problem of evil. Therefore, it can be reasonably concluded that the problem of evil, as found in the logically valid and sound argument above, demonstrates that the existence of evil effectively refutes the existence of an all-knowing, all-loving, and all-powerful God. If God does exist, it necessarily does not contain all three of these properties. The existence of evil, then, is the biggest problem for theists who contend that such a God does indeed exist; the onus is on such individuals to either change their positions or find more convincing theodicies.